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# A decision model: contract vs. in-house foodservice a case study: Rochester Riverside Convention Center

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A DECISION MODEL: CONTRACT VS.  
IN-HOUSE FOODSERVICE

CASE STUDY



ROCHESTER  
RIVERSIDE CONVENTION CENTER

By  
Mark L. Poole

A thesis/project submitted to the  
Faculty of the School of Food, Hotel, and Tourism Management  
at  
Rochester Institute of Technology  
in partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree  
of  
Master of Science

May 1994

**ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY**  
**School of Food, Hotel and Travel Management**  
**Department of Graduate Studies**

**M.S. Hospitality-Tourism Management**  
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# Chapter 1

## A. Introduction

Rochester, New York, located in upstate New York on Lake Ontario has 250,000 residents living within the city and approximately one million residents in the counties surrounding the city. Rochester is best known for its manufacturing, educational institutions and science/technology industries.

The Rochester Riverside Convention Center is a 100,000 square foot flexible exhibit and meeting facility. The facility offers a 50,000 square foot exhibit hall and 10,000 square foot ballroom. Twenty two meeting rooms separated by movable airwalls are available for meetings and food and beverage functions. Exact dimensions, capacities and floor plans are located in the chart in appendix A.

The objective of the center is to attract groups and associations into the city to attend conventions, fill hotel rooms and thus bring revenues into the local economy. It is considered a loss leader, losing more money than it is able to bring in through rental and services. Funding to support the operational deficit is generated from two sources: the city

hotel/motel tax and the city's taxpayers.

The shortfall of funds as of 1993 was approximately \$1 million. This shortfall is measured against the annual economic impact of visitors to the community, which amounted to \$17 million.

Foodservice revenue as of 1993 fiscal year make up 70% of the operating budget of the facility. This makes it the largest revenue source. In 1985, prior to opening, foodservice was contracted out to Ogden Allied Services, a major contract feeder. In 1988, Joseph Floreano, the Executive Director, in conjunction with the Mayor of Rochester, Thomas Ryan, made the decision to take foodservice in-house.

This case study examine's the decisional process of transferring from contract to in-house foodservice. Also, five years of financial statements will be evaluated as a means to measure performance.

## **B. Background:**

The trend in convention center management has been to contract many of the service needs of the facility to outside vendors. The largest revenue segment under a contract agreement has been food and beverage services.

Contract organizations normally require a negotiated percentage of gross revenues as a service fee to operate the account. Contract organizations set quality specifications as well as standard operating procedures on a national basis. These procedures and specifications are set in order to satisfy not only the convention center account but also the needs of the contract organization. This dual goal can constrict individual convention center flexibility, leading to lower food and beverage revenues and profits.

Over the last decade some facilities have taken food and beverage services in-house. Operating in-house services has yielded a number of measurable benefits. With flexibility and control, directors are able to set standards and procedures that are customized to that particular facility, thereby increasing the level of sales revenues. With increasing city and state budgetary deficits, there is a continuous need to pursue cost-reducing activities as well as revenue enhancements. City and state officials often lack foresight in the levels of funding and support that convention center projects will require in the future.

One can begin to reverse these obstacles with an objective to continuously increase the revenue and profits of

food and beverage service. With food and beverage having the potential to be the largest single revenue generating entity for some centers, increasing food and beverage profits will indirectly lessen the burden on taxpayers and subsequent political pressure on convention center management team.

#### **C. Purpose:**

This study will examine the Rochester Riverside Convention Center as an example of the decision process for taking food and beverage services in-house. Exploration of the financial track record for five years of independent operation (FY1988-1993) will be included. It is believed that this will identify the decisions convention centers have to make in order to shift from contract to in-house foodservice.

#### **D. The Problem Statement**

Today, there is a lack of knowledge and experience in the convention center industry to enable management to take over food and beverage activities.

## **E. Assumptions**

- This study assumes that criteria can be generated to determine feasibility of a convention center making the change from contract to in-house.
- This study assumes that unprofitable areas, or areas which are beyond the ability of a convention center, may be outsourced.
- This study assumes that a convention center is in the financial condition enabling it to fund a takeover.
- This study assumes that there is a fully operational volume foodservice kitchen on the premises.

Ideological Assumptions- By usage of accepted financial measures of performance, personal bias influencing project results is avoided.

## **F. Scope and Limitations:**

This study examines the Rochester Riverside Convention Center from FY1987 to FY1993 as it shifted from contract to in-house foodservice. It is the intent of this study to provide a working model based on the Rochester Riverside Convention Center as a basis for other convention centers to ascertain

whether or not a similar shift would be feasible.

The study is limited both by the model (Rochester Riverside Convention Center) and the variability of all other convention centers. Since there are so many factors affecting the viability of a convention center, most of which do not yield to the influence of the center's management, there may be only a few centers similar in size, scope, facilities, mission, etc., which would be able to use the model without significant revision. Nevertheless, some may find the model appropriate for adaptation.

## **G. Methodology**

The primary methodology used was the case study. The case study analyzed data from Rochester Convention Center financial statements for the fiscal years 1987-1993. Analysis of this data has taken the form of graphs comparing financial performance to operating years. A Gantt chart shows the time line of events leading to and through the process of takeover. Anecdotal information from foodservice records and research as well as interviews of Joseph Floreano (Executive Director) and Paul Cramer (Assistant Executive Director), who were instrumental in the transfer at the Rochester facility.

With a focus on the key issue, extraneous investigations can be eliminated, thus moving the project towards its purpose, which is to offer a descriptive analysis for the decisions and processes of moving a convention center's foodservice from contract to an in-house operation.

#### **H. Definition of Terms:**

Contract Foodservice: Foodservice provided by an outside operator returning a percentage of revenues or management fee to the convention center for operations.

Economic Impact: Direct spending by visitors, delegates, associations, and exhibitors to the community as well as direct employment impact and tax impact.

Fiscal Year (FY): For budgetary purposes the Rochester Convention Center year begins in July and runs through June.

In-house (Foodservice): Food and beverage services established and operated by convention center management, separate from services contracted to outside vendors. Also known as "self-op".

Outsourcing: Entering into a contractual obligation with an outside company to provide product and services within a given convention center facility.



## Chapter 2

### Review Of The Literature

Over the past few years articles have been written examining the issues surrounding the decision to outsource or operate foodservice in-house. In February 1994, *Amusement Business Magazine* reported that the Thomas Mack Center in Las Vegas announced its decision to takeover foodservice to an in-house managed operation. This decision was made after ten years of operation under contract by Volume Services Inc.. Their stated objective in taking over foodservice was the potential for increased revenues/profitability, the ability to control labor, food pricing, and a closer control on quality. In most cases management was not unhappy with the use of contract service, however, they deemed the economic potential to be greater being managed in-house. (Deckard, 1993)

The subject of foodservice takeover as reported by Deckard in *Amusement Business* in February 1994, dominated a foodservice panel discussion at the District IV and VIII sections of the International Association of Auditorium Managers (IAAM) convention held in Salt Lake City. The IAAM panel discussion centered around a debate regarding the positive and negative points of contract versus in-house. The panel included Bob Anderson, Thomas Mack Center, Las Vegas; Jeff Blosser, Oregon Convention Center, Portland; Bob Stefanski, Ogden Entertainment

Services; Judhi Chopping, Meydenbauer Convention Center, Bellevue, Wash.; Scott Williams, Delta Center, Salt Lake City. Centers were included that currently operate in-house as well as representation from contract organizations.

Positive aspects as communicated by directors with in-house foodservice were that with a lack of management fees the financial aspects were very enticing to make the transfer. Additional flexibility of directors to designate and monitor levels of quality and service were positive. Scott Williams, Executive Director of the Delta Center in Salt Lake City, an in-house concept, felt that facilities operators that have outsourced food and beverage look at their profit and loss statements with management fees and are drawn closer to the in-house (also referred to as “self-op” in the article) takeover.

Positive points for contracted foodservice were lower levels of risk and day to day operational responsibilities. Bob Stefanski from Ogden Entertainment, a contractor, said that contract companies bring value to facilities in that they make large investments in equipment, leasehold improvements and contract acquisition. In addition, they also bring national account buying power and insurance coverage including high cost coverages such as liquor liability and workers comp coverages. (Donoho, 1993)

Negative points regarding self-op were that self-op was viewed to be

only as good as the local managers. There was a greater risk depending on the available pool of qualified personnel. Risk of failure was great due to risk and costs of a standalone operation.

Negative points regarding contracting were that contract vendors tend to be very bottom line oriented. Profitability and quality are sacrificed for higher earnings.

The overall feeling of managers on the panel who currently contract out foodservice was that they were skeptical about whether or not to initiate a self-op decision or a takeover process. Bob Anderson from the Mack Center sees a necessary importance in that the concept of self-op must be part of the company's mission. The panel clearly felt that it was not in the best interest of all facilities to pursue the self-op concept. Many facilities did not have the management experience or potential to make a takeover successful. This article eluded to the fact that it takes a great effort to run foodservice--an effort some facility managers would like to leave to someone else. (Deckard, 1993)

Judhi Chopping, executive director, of the Meydenbauer Convention Center discussed their decision to go self-op with the September 1993 opening of the center. Management took proposals from many contract organizations and weighed all the options. In their end analysis the management fee on outsourcing projections would cost more than

\$100,000 to the bottom line. The financial ramifications motivated the company's decision to self-op. Her feelings on the move to self-op were that "Managers often feel inept at food service, and I had a little bit of knowledge." The financial results look good on paper, but the knowledge and experience is vital to long term success. (Deckard, 1993)

William Just, executive vice president and cofounder of the Association for Convention Marketing Executives, explains in an article in *Association Management* that municipalities across the country are tightening their belts and looking around for new revenues. Local government is looking at budget cuts wherever possible and seeking to raise tax dollars. Convention centers traditionally viewed as loss leaders to attract free-spending conventioners into the city's hotels and restaurants are being urged to minimize their losses and come as close to breaking even as possible. The concept of break-even is still relatively new in the convention center business; few centers have ever made it to that point. This article points to the fact that states build these facilities but underestimate the long term need for funding. (Just, 1993)

If facilities are losing money, perhaps the prices they are charging should be adjusted to make up some of the expenses. Rising costs of food and beverage was the subject of an article in *Convene Magazine*. Citing a feeling of astronomical markups on food and beverage, the author, Toni

Grainer, posed the question “Where else but in a convention center can you find a gallon of coffee costing \$32.00 before tax and gratuity?” (Grainer, 1993). With tighter budgets and rising costs consumers become more and more sensitive to the costs of planning meal functions for large groups. This creates a dilemma for convention center management teams. If expenses are too high, the market will not bear higher prices for the goods and services offered.

Due to a slow economy in the hotel industry, hotels have become more interested in contracting outside foodservice in the form of catering. This may also include securing longer term contracts for catering the food and beverage needs of public facilities. Hotels in many cases due to their direct proximity vie for contracts to cater foodservices at convention centers. In a March 1994 article in *Agent and Manager*, the author discusses the competition between hotels and convention centers. Gary Shaw, convention manager of the Bostrom Corporation feels that planners rely on hotel chefs for varied menus and elaborate presentations. In comparison, he feels that convention centers “try hard” but the staff is unable to compete with the skill of a hotel banquet chef. He feels that convention centers are capable of preparing hot dogs and hamburgers, but, the rest should be left to more qualified operators. The quality of foodservice offered at hotels is perceived to be higher in most cases to that of convention centers. Some hotels look to use this perception to their

benefit when bidding on convention center contracts. (Israel, 1994)

In an article on the advantages and disadvantages of contracting school foodservices Stephen LeBruto and Behshid Farsad draw some parallels to the subject being examined here. They feel the advantages of a contract relationship are tighter control of costs, fewer costly benefits packages, and application of systems and of current technology. They site the fact that the self-op concept relies on the food service professional in its employ for the development of methods and procedures. This individual does not have the corporate back-up that contract companies can offer an account. An important advantage of the contract relationship is the lack of bearing the costly component of wages, salaries and benefits which in recent times have become an even more burdening constraint in a labor intensive industry. Food service companies are able to offer employee training programs and continuing educational opportunities, a luxury not always possible in a convention center facility. (Lebruto/Farasad, 1993)

Disadvantages to employing the outside operator in a school food-service situation are a loss in personal relations with customers, staff, and foodservice employees. Losses in operational control are inevitable, which can lead to lower standards, improper equipment maintenance and deterioration of community goodwill. Foodservice management companies are "for profit" entities that will strive for bottom line profit objectives.

This may involve frequent transfer of employees, which decreases the opportunity for developing relationships. Standards can suffer as a result of contract operators reducing labor and food quality for the purpose of achieving financial gains.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Tabulation and Analysis of The Data**

Data comparison in Figure 1 was examined by contrasting Food and Beverage Net Income against the total revenue for the Rochester Convention Center. On the following page is a line chart showing two years of Ogden performance (FY'87-'88) and five years of in-house performance (FY'89-'93). The years under Ogden produced an average net income of nine percent. Within three years of in-house operation, the Center experienced over 100% increase in net income as a percentage of total revenue. This comprised 19% of total revenue in FY1993. In FY'91-'92 there was a correction due to local economic recession, corporate cutbacks and the delayed opening the Hyatt Regency Hotel.






Figure 1.--Food and Beverage Net Income as a Percentage of Total Rochester Riverside Convention Center Revenue

A review of food and beverage net income for FY'87-FY'88 (Ogden) as compared to FY'89-FY'93 (RRCC In-House) is illustrated in Figure 2. This chart shows increases in the annual contribution to overhead. In the two years that Ogden contributed dollars to offset the deficit, net income reached a high of \$180,000 in FY'88. The In-house foodservice more than doubled that in the first year of the takeover(FY'89). Fiscal year 1993 proved to be the highest level with a contribution of \$800,000 to the shortfall. These figures are significant given the deficit of \$1 million. If net income from food and beverage continues to rise, it could offset a majority of the deficit. This would move the facility closer to a break-even status.




Figure 2---Food and Beverage Net Income (Thousands)

The Gantt chart (Figure 3) found on the next page outlines the start and end points of the steps made to takeover the Rochester operation.


The process began in April of 1988 and commenced in September 1988. The significant points begin with the budgetary problems experienced in April. The decision was made soon after that meeting which set the process into motion. The short time frame was due to the ending of the fiscal year on July 1, 1988. Managements goal was to takeover operations on July 1. Ogdens last meal was served days prior to the July 1 deadline.

The inhouse team began operating with its first event on July 4, 1988, the annual client appreciation party, which made for a smooth transition introducing the new organization to the new staff.


Staffing, menu planning, policies, procedures and training were completed during the slow summer months in order to be ready for the peak fall season.

# Gantt Chart:

## Transfer Process-Rochester Riverside Convention Center



 July 1, 1988  
 Takeover

 Date of start and completion

**Figure 3.--Gantt Chart**

## **Steps for generic transfer process:**

Listed in order of approximate importance, starting with highest.

Process should be completed in approximately nine months.

1. Complete feasibility study
2. Make decision
  - a. Company mission
  - b. Goals and Objectives
3. Secure funding source for buyout
  - a. Capital funding through city
  - b. Capital funds available in convention center reserves
  - c. State grants
4. Secure qualified Food and Beverage Director
  - a. National, Local search
5. Hire transfer consultant
  - a. Recognized in industry
  - b. Bring on board six months prior to transfer

6. Establish staffing levels
  - a. Investigate historical revenues
  - b. Revenue potential
  - c. Local staff quality and availability
  - d. Hire staff
7. Estimate contract value
  - a. Inventory equipment
  - b. Goodwill
8. Create policies, procedures, and operational processes
  - a. Guest satisfaction measurement process
  - b. Employee manual
  - c. Job descriptions
  - d. Inventory procedures
  - e. Financial reports, controls and tracking
  - f. Budget set-up
9. Create marketing plan
  - a. Target market

- b. Quality and service objectives

- 10. Staff training

- a. Transitory program

- b. General program



Interviews with:

Executive Director, Rochester Riverside Convention Center 4/27/94

10:00AM

Assistant Executive Director, Rochester Riverside Convention Center

4/27/94 8:00AM

The process for the takeover of foodservice at the Rochester Riverside Convention Center began in 1983. Joseph Floreano had been selected from a pool of 50 candidates by members of the Rochester business community to operate the proposed downtown convention center. He came to Rochester with a personal goal to run a facility that produced its own foodservice.

In early meetings with the city's director of personnel Mr. Paul Breyer, it became evident that opening the center with its own foodservice would not be an easy process. The city would mandate that all employees below management would have to be civil service employees, including the chef, and other major operational positions. This was compounded by a meeting with the city's director of purchasing which outlined how purchasing would be handled. All purchases would be handled through the city purchasing department. The example at the time that was given

was that if a client wanted chocolate cake and it was put out to bid and no bids were returned then the client would be unable to have chocolate cake.

It became evident that the way the city envisioned the process to be handled would not yield well to the hospitality industry. That left the normal next step in convention center planing which was to seek bids from outside operators.

To pursue an outside operator, a food and beverage committee was formed to investigate contractors. Directors at the city as well as outside hospitality business executives were summoned to the task of evaluating incoming proposals and making a final decision.

A request for proposal was put out and was answered by Service America, Ogden Allied Services, and a local organization, Sibley Catering. Some interest was later expressed by Marriott Corporation as well.

Through a study of each company's service and quality, financial status, and viewing of active accounts, a decision was made to have Ogden Allied be the official provider of food and beverage services at the center. A key determination in making this decision was the level of service that the company could provide. Ogden Allied was selected based on the feeling of the committee that Ogden would best serve the needs and expectations of the Rochester market.

In February of 1985, a contract was entered into by the City of Rochester and Ogden Allied Services. The strategy employed by

Mr. Floreano was to keep the investment on the part of Ogden to a minimum. All major capital purchasing was done by the city. Ogden was responsible for mainly smallwares to keep their investment low. This would enable an easier transfer at a later date. As well, a clause was written into the contract giving the convention center the right to break the contract at anytime to take services in-house.

By August of 1985, a separate not for profit corporation was set up to oversee the running of the center. This helped the center to operate out of direct control by the city. It is not common to have a separate board of directors, many centers are a department of the city and must handle a greater degree of bureaucracy in operating.

Ogden had a slow start after the opening in August 1985. This was due to their lack of making advanced sales. Information had been forwarded to their corporate offices, but management, sales, and employees were not onsite until weeks beforehand. Media coverage for the grand opening was plentiful and positive. Great expectations on the part of the community were evident during this time.

Soon after the opening, quality problems began to plague events at the center. Quality of food was the main area of concern. In the first year it was explained away as the newness of the facility and that problems had to be ironed out of the new operation. It became evident that Ogden was not investing in qualified or experienced people. It was further recognized

that the contractor was going to maintain their revenue potential/ profitability at a high cost to the operation.

This realization was difficult to understand on the part of convention center management and board of directors. It had been discussed in the contract negotiation that the level of quality and service was to be high. In an attempt to ensure this higher level, a 10% rather than a normal 25% commission back to the city was negotiated into the contract.

Unfortunately, the reputation continued to fall. Letters and phone calls to the Mayor's office from unhappy clients of the center were constant. The tracking of groups using the center showed groups that had not returned because of poor quality. A meeting was set by Mayor Ryan to address the problem with Mr. Floreano and Mitch Savage from Ogden Corporate regarding the falling levels of quality. Ogden responded by making some management changes. The changes proved to be a short term solution to the initial quality problems.

In March of 1988, Mr. Floreano met with the Mayor and the city's budget director to discuss the next fiscal budget. It was at this time that the Mayor explained that the city was experiencing increasing budgetary difficulties. The subsidy to the center was increasing and revenues were staying flat. The commissions on food and beverage were coming in below projections. At this meeting Mr. Floreano recommended the takeover of food and beverage. Mayor Ryan supported the decision and asked Mr.

Floreano to proceed.

That afternoon, the Mayor's office contacted Mr. Floreano to prepare a council item to secure the funding for the buyout. At this point, word had not been given to Ogden about the change. Unfortunately, the press picked up on the council item and called Ogden Corporate for a response. This put the process in a delicate situation for a while.

The next immediate step was for Mr. Floreano to bring in a Food and Beverage Director to oversee the transfer process which was slated for July 1, 1988. He called upon Paul Cramer who had worked with Ogden Allied as a banquet manager at the Rochester Center. Mr. Cramer arrived in May 1988. Mr. Cramer began the process of organizing the systems to takeover operations.

Mr. Cramer began the process of takeover by completing a self-evaluation of the operation. Through this process he developed a mission statement and business philosophy. The high end market segment was targeted as not to compete with the local party houses who were concerned over possible losses of business. Budgetary numbers were set-up, staffing levels for the new operation were put in place and a menu was developed.

The next area was to establish a system of controls and policies. These areas were broken down into bar, banquet, kitchen, concessions, and sales. Goals and objectives were put into place for these areas to facilitate

tracking of success.

Organization and hiring of the majority of the staff was completed in the month prior to takeover. Items to be taken by Ogden were inventoried, the value of those items left had a depreciated value placed on them. The buyout was completed successfully on July 1, 1988. The new organization reported directly to Joe Floreano and the board of directors.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusions**

#### **Summary:**

Through this investigation it became clear that quite a high degree of risk was assumed in pursuing this takeover. The decision for a takeover of foodservice is one of risk versus possible financial gain. In the Rochester case study city budgetary reasons as well as quality concerns, motivated the organization to implement a takeover.

#### **Recommendations:**

When examining contract versus in-house foodservice an organization must examine long term strategy and mission. The current mission of a convention center to bring convention business into the city could hamper efforts to reach a breakeven point. It is really not possible to achieve both objectives. Revenue is normally constrained by a “no compete” policy for local business. In order to maximize revenue potential for food and beverage the “no compete” policy should be lifted. This would be a highly controversial political decision on the part of city officials due pressures from local community business leaders.

Future recommendations for other operators seeking to transfer food and beverage services would be to complete a feasibility study of the

operation prior to making the decision. Through this feasibility study, problem areas or areas of unprofitability could be discovered. It is quite possible through takeover to put together in-house operations with outsourced services to create an optimum package.

One of the most challenging areas for directors is managing the amount of risk that is involved in taking foodservice in-house. This risk takes the form of increased liability, and bearing a higher degree of costs of a stand alone operation. Risk also takes the form of a danger of management losing control by the sudden addition of complete responsibility and accountability for foodservice operations.

There needs to be an acceptance of change in daily operations. As in the Rochester example, the target market segment and the level of quality were changed. A successful transition should include staff training and development. Staff should be educated regarding the new market and the change in expectations. An adequate transition period can avoid staff falling into past practices.

Flexibility, contingencies and a greater understanding of personnel is an area of great importance. For example, if the chef disappears, there is no corporate back-up. This puts a great degree of pressure on the human resources aspect. Existing personnel then bear the burden of the overload. In an in-house concept your marketing plan relies heavily on your most recent function; there is no national ad campaign endorsing your business.



A failure in one event could result in lost profits.

It is further recommended that a consultant be secured through the pre-opening organization and setup of the new operation due to the normally short time lines where assistance on a short term basis is required. The expertise of a consultant in the industry would be invaluable to those operators who possess limited knowledge or experience in foodservice operations.

### **Conclusion:**

The result of observation of the Rochester Convention Center points to a successful takeover of foodservice operations. The need for an increasing subsidy was avoided due to increases in revenue after the takeover. This study concentrated on the financial aspects of the decision to transfer.

Further study is needed to establish benchmarks for quality and service in this industry. That type of information would require a study establishing primary information which could be used by other convention centers. In the Rochester example, poor quality was cited as an important impetus for the transfer. The poor quality perception measured through lost business and negative correspondence was turned around by the in-house operation. Positive letters of praise increased and repeat business returned to the facility.

From this examination it can be concluded that the Rochester Convention Center is a pioneer that took the risks in a fairly uncharted area of foodservice takeover. Other facilities may not want to take as big a risk but steps as outlined above can be taken to reduce that risk.

The financial impact of a successful foodservice operation can be the difference between an increasing need for subsidy and a means of which to effectively manage operational costs and long term viability. Given the increasingly wide degree of fiscal responsibility, convention centers need to look at every feasible source for revenue enhancement and cost reduction. Moving from a contract foodservice to in-house is one such means for revenue enhancement.

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

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## City of Rochester Map



SOUTH AVENUE

DIRECT  
DRIVE-ON  
ENTRANCE

UPPER LEVEL LOADING DOCK

ESCALATORS TO  
MEZZANINE  
ADMIN. OFFICES,  
HYATT HOTEL &  
PARKING



ESC

SKYWAY

EMPIRE LOUNGE

ESC

EMPIRE  
LOBBY

ESC


EXHIBIT LEVEL

SKYWAY

HOLIDAY  
INN HOTEL







# Dimensions and Room Capacities

	DIMENSIONS L X W	AREA IN SQUARE FEET	CEILING HEIGHT	MEETING THEATRE STYLE	BANQUET	10' X 10' BOOTHS	CLASSROOM	CONFERENCE	RECEPTION CAPACITY
<b>EXHIBITION HALL &amp; BALLROOM</b>									
Exhibition Hall North	165' x 35'	5,775	20'	200	600	12	—	—	200
Exhibition Hall South	165' x 35'	5,775	20'	200	600	12	—	—	200
Ballroom	153' x 58'	8,874	11' 7 1/3'	1,000	600	51	360	280	920
Ballroom (split)	153' x 58'	8,874	11' 7 1/3'	1,000	600	51	360	280	920
<b>MEETING &amp; EXHIBIT ROOMS</b>									
<b>HIGHLAND ROOMS (total)</b>	153' x 58'	8,874	11' 7 1/3'	1,000	600	51	360	280	920
Highland Room A	35' x 29'	1,015	13'	110	50	—	48	32	120
Highland Room B	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room C	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room D	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room E	29' x 24'	696	13'	90	30	—	24	24	70
Highland Room F	29' x 24'	696	13'	90	30	—	24	24	70
Highland Room G	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room H	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room I	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room J	30' x 29'	870	13'	100	40	—	36	28	90
Highland Room K	35' x 29'	1,015	13'	110	50	—	48	32	120
<b>CLASADO ROOMS (total)</b>	92' x 24'	2,208	10' 11 1/2'	288	170	—	84	28	100
Clasado Room A	24' x 17'	408	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
Clasado Room B	24' x 15'	360	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
Clasado Room C	24' x 15'	360	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
Clasado Room D	24' x 15'	360	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
Clasado Room E	24' x 15'	360	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
Clasado Room F	24' x 14'	336	12'	36	20	—	16	10	30
<b>AQUEDUCT ROOMS</b>	—	1,260	10' 1/2'	50	80	—	48	16	120
Aqueduct Room A	21' x 14'	294	12'	24	20	—	12	16	30
Aqueduct Room B	21' x 14'	294	12'	24	20	—	12	16	30
Aqueduct Room C	21' x 14'	294	12'	24	20	—	12	16	30
Aqueduct Room D	21' x 14'	294	12'	24	20	—	12	16	30
Aqueduct Rooms AB	28' x 21'	588	12'	50	40	3	24	24	60
Aqueduct Rooms CD	28' x 21'	588	12'	50	40	3	24	24	60
<b>OTHER LOCATIONS</b>									
East Corridor	165' x 20'	3,300	12'	—	—	12	—	—	200
West Corridor	165' x 20'	3,300	12'	—	—	12	—	—	200
Galleria	103' x 38'	3,914	60'	—	—	15	—	—	325
Empire Lobby	60' x 55'	3,300	25'	—	—	12	—	—	150
Empire Lounge	145' x 15'	2,175	10'	—	—	—	—	—	150
Riverside Court	54' x 38'	2,052	12'	200	150	10	—	—	150
VIP Conference Room	11' x 10'	110	8' 6"	—	—	—	—	10	—
Conference Room	30' x 14'	420	8' 6"	—	—	—	—	22	—

NOTE: All set capabilities specified are maximum capabilities; space for a head table and podium is not included.